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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ANNOTATIONS
breach within a reasonable time as Section 2-607(3) required, and also that
there was insufficient evidence for the jury to determine the proper amount
of damages. The measure of damages, it argued, should not have been the
defendant's production losses but the difference between the value of the
experimental chicks at the time and place of acceptance and the value they
would have had if they had been as warranted, under Section 2-714(2). In
affirming the refusal of the lower court to grant either motion, the court held,
first, that the jury could have inferred that the plaintiff had received timely
notice of the breach through the periodic reports submitted to it, and, second,
that the nature of the warranty being what it was, that the experimental
chicks would produce "as good or better" than certain others, the measure of
damages was correct.
COMMENT
Under Section 2-714(2), the usual measure of damages for breach of
warranty is the difference between the value of the goods at the time and
place of acceptance and the value that they would have had if they had been
as warranted. However, when "special circumstances" show damages in a
different amount, such damages may be recovered. While it could be argued
that the production lasses suffered by the defendant in the present case should
merely go to the value of the experimental chicks, there would seem to be
nothing to commend this view. The court did not specifically allude to the
"special circumstances" proviso of Section 2-714(2) but the holding is cer-
tainly explainable in terms of it.
S.L.P.
ARTICLE 3: COMMERCIAL PAPER
SECTION 3-114. Date, Antedating, Postdating
PAZOL V. CITIZENS NAT'L BANK
138 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964)
Annotated under Section 3-301, infra.
SECTION 3-301. Rights of a Holder
PAZOL V. CITIZENS NAT'L BANK
138 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964)
The payee of a check drawn by the defendant deposited the check in his
account at the plaintiff-bank and was allowed to withdraw the full amount.
When the check was later dishonored, the plaintiff brought the present action
on the instrument, in its own name. The petition alleged, inter alia, that the
check was executed, delivered and dated January 4, 1964; however, the
attached copy of the check showed that it was actually dated January 4, 1963.
The lower court overruled the defendant's general demurrer and the defendant
appealed.
The defendant argued, first, that since the payee's indorsement had
been supplied by the plaintiff, the plaintiff could not be a "holder" as defined
by Section 1-201(20) and consequently could not enforce payment in its own
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name under Section 3-301. The defendant admitted that a depositary bank
could in certain cases supply a customer's indorsement under Section
4-205(1). He argued, however, that according to the Official Comment to
this section, the power to supply an indorsement could be exercised only
when the depositor was a "non-bank depositor," i.e., one depositing in some-
thing other than a bank. The court rejected this argument, construing the
phrase to mean a depositor which is not a bank. It then held that since the
indorsement supplied by the plaintiff was permitted by Sections 3-302(2) and
4-205(1), the plaintiff was in possession of an instrument "indorsed to [it]";
it was therefore a "holder" as defined by Section 1-201(20) and had the right
to sue in its own name under Section 3-301.
The court further suggested that the check was "issued" to the plaintiff,
though its reason for so holding is unclear.
Second, the defendant made the related argument that, since the plaintiff
was presumed to be the payee's collection agent under Section 4-201(1), it
could not sue in its own name but only in its capacity as agent. The court
rejected this argument, stating that ownership of an item is irrelevant in
determining the status of a holder and that the presumed agency status of the
bank did not derogate from the bank's right to bring suit in its own name.
The court indicated that the plaintiff was allegedly a holder in due course
as defined by Section 3-302(1). By crediting the payee's account in the face
amount of the check and permitting the credit to be withdrawn, the plaintiff
had given value for the instrument (Sections 4-209, 4-208(1) and 3-303),
thus satisfying Section 3-302(1) (a). The plaintiff alleged that it had acted in
good faith, thus satisfying Section 3-302(1) (b). Finally, the plaintiff's allega-
tion that it did not have notice that the check was overdue was sufficient to
satisfy Section 3-302(1) (c): The.fact that the check was dated 1963 did not
ipso facto give the plaintiff notice that it was overdue since parol evidence
was admissible to overcome the Section 3-114(3) presumption that . the date
inscribed on the check was correct.
Finally, the court adverted to the liability of a drawer to pay the amount
of his dishonored check, Section 3-413(2), and affirmed the lower court's
overruling of the demurrer.
COMMENT
In its opinion the court suggested that the plaintiff was a holder not
only because the check was indorsed to it but also because it was issued to it.
This suggestion is erroneous. First delivery to the payee constituted issuance
under Section 3-102(1) (a), while the transfer of the check from the payee to
the plaintiff constituted negotiation.
Since mere production of an instrument is sufficient under Section
3-307(2) to entitle a holder to recover unless a defense is established, it
would appear that the court's discussion of the plaintiff's status as a holder
in due course was unnecessary. A general demurrer does not ipso facto estab-
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SECTION 3-302. Holder in Due Course
PAZOL V. CITIZENS NAT'L BANK
138 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964)
Annotated under Section 3-301, supra.
SECTION 3-303. Taking for Value
PAZOL V. CITIZENS NAT'L BANK
138 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964)
Annotated under Section 3-301, supra.
SECTION 3-304. Notice to Purchaser
NATIONAL CURRENCY EXCHANGE, INC. #3 V. PERKINS
201 N.E.2d 668 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964)
The defendant on May 14, 1960, drew a check payable to Stauropoulos
and dated it May 16, 1960. Statnopoulos cashed the check on May 14 at the
plaintiff's currency exchange. When the check was later dishonored, the
plaintiff brought the present suit on the instrument. The trial court, finding
that the plaintiff was a holder in due course, entered judgment for it. The
defendant appealed, arguing that the postdating rendered the check irregular
on its face, that it was thus impossible for the plaintiff to be a holder in due
course, and that the plaintiff was therefore'subject to any defenses which the
defendant might have against the payee. The instant court, in affirming the
decision below, conceded that Section 12 of the Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Law was ambiguous on the point in issue but that, according to the
majority of jurisdictions which had ruled on the question, mere negotiation
of a postdated check prior to the date it bears does not of itself prevent a
a transferee from becoming a holder in due course..In adhering to the
majority view, the court looked to the policy favoring negotiability and to
sound commercial practice and experience. Section 3-304(4) (a) of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, which became effective in Illinois after the check was
drawn, negotiated and dishonored, evidenced that practice. That section
specifically rejects those decisions which hold that a known antedating or
postdating prevents a transferee from becoming a holder in due course.
J.F.O'L.'
SECTION 3-305. Rights of a Holder in Due Course
MEADOW BROOK NAT'L BANK V. ROGERS
253 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Nassau County Ct. 1964)
The defendant drew a check payable to the order of James Thomas who
subsequently negotiated it to the plaintiff-bank. In the suit on the instrument,
the defendant pleaded lack of consideration and fraud in the inducement,
alleging that Thomas had made certain false representations to her. The
court, applying Sections 54, 94 and 96 of the Negotiable Instruments Law,
held that the defendant's personal defenses could not be pleaded against a
holder in due course and granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
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The court stated that if the transaction had occurred after September 27,
1964, the Uniform Commercial Code would have been applicable (Section
10-101), although the same result would have been dictated by Section 3-305.
J.F.O'L.
SECTION 3-413. Contract of Maker, Drawer and Acceptor
PAZOL V. CITIZENS NAT'L BANK
138 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964)
Annotated under Section 3-301, supra.
ARTICLE 4: BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS
SECTION 4-201. Presumption and Duration of Agency
Status of Collecting Banks and
Provisional Status of Credits;
Applicability of Articles; Item
Indorsed "Pay Any Bank"
PAZOL V. CITIZENS NAT'L BANK
138 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964)
Annotated under Section 3-301, supra.
SECTION 4-205. Supplying Missing Indorsement; No
Notice from Prior Indorsement
PAZOL V. CITIZENS NAT'L BANK
138 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964)
Annotated under Section 3-301, supra.
SECTION 4-208. Security Interest of Collecting Bank
in items, Accompanying Documents
and Proceeds
PAZOL V. CITIZENS NAT'L BANK
138 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964)
Annotated under Section 3-301, supra.
SECTION 4-209. When Bank Gives Value for Purposes
of Holder in Due Course
PAZOL V. CITIZENS NAT'L BANK
138 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964)
Annotated under Section 3-301, supra.
SECTION 4-211. Media of Remittance; Provisional
and Final Settlement in Remittance
Cases
CITIZENS BANK V. NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE
334 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1964)
To be annotated in Volume 6, Issue 4.
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